Statutory interpretation: How legal reasoning and linguistics interact
VNU Journal of Science: Legal Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2021) 60-67
Original Article
Statutory Interpretation:
How Legal Reasoning and Linguistics Interact
Nguyen Thai Son*
Faculty of Legal Languages, Ho Chi Minh City University of Law,
2 Nguyen Tat Thanh St., Dist. 4, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
Received 29 September 2021
Revised 21 October 2021; Accepted 6 November 2021
Abstract: The relationship between law and language has been widely discussed as early as in 1963
when Mellinkoff published the well-known book ‘The Language of the Law’ in the US. The
linguistic analysis presented in this paper is an attempt to study legal interpretation from an
interdisciplinary perspective. In particular, it is intended to demonstrate actual disputes (mostly US
cases) that require interpreting statutes as how legal reasoning and linguistics interact. Starting with
a brief account of linguistic indeterminacy and different forms of indeterminacy in legal contexts,
the author will then focus on various approaches provided by legal scholars and linguists when it
comes to uncertainty in construing law. Finally, a Polish case study will be presented to exemplify
how linguistic analysis, along with legal argumentation, can practically contribute to the
effectiveness of legal drafting and interpretation.
Keywords: Legal construction, statutory interpretation, law-linguistics interaction, legal language,
legal reasoning.
1. Introduction *
law is a law of words’. This assertion is based on
the fact that regardless of varied sources of law
in the Anglo-American legal system, all
currently exist in the form of words and
documents through the process of codification.
Working with language that constitutes the law,
therefore, has become an intensive focus for
legal professionals whose job inevitably
involves dealing with an array of normative
“The law is a profession of words” - the
opening statement made by Mellinkoff [1] in his
very first book “The Language of the Law” - has
so far inspired legal scholars and linguists alike
to turn their attention to legal language.
Likewise, Tiersma [2] confirms the inherent
connection between language and law since ‘our
_______
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: [email protected]
60
N. T. Son / VNU Journal of Science: Legal Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2021) 60-67
61
documents ranging from statutes to judicial
opinions. Also, it is essentially through language
that an attorney can discuss legal matters, advise
their clients, or argue in court. In many cases, the
evidence presented to the judge exists in
language forms such as recordings, notes,
contracts, wills, deeds, etc. Law and language
are so closely intertwined that ‘few professions
are as dependent upon language’ [2].
however, are expected to settle disputes over
imprecise meaning by construing law with
argumentation [5]. In such regards, this paper
aims to discuss statutory interpretation in actual
disputes (mostly US cases) as to how legal
reasoning and linguistics interact. It begins with
a brief account of linguistic indeterminacy and
different forms of indeterminacy in legal
contexts. This will be followed by a discussion
on different approaches provided by legal
scholars and linguists when it comes to
uncertainty or indeterminacy in legal
construction. Finally, a Polish case study will be
presented to exemplify how linguistic analysis,
along with legal arguments, can contribute to the
effectiveness of legal drafting and interpretation.
However, it is also the fact that human
language is characterized by indeterminacy or
uncertainty [3,4]. Although one tends to assume
that what they want to say/ write can be said/
written so clearly and precisely, our actual
language use is inherently indeterminate.
Discussing the indeterminate nature of language,
Cao [3] points out that linguistic indeterminacy
is associated with ambiguity, vagueness,
generality and other such features as pervasive
parts of language. This linguistic nature stems
from the fact that ‘the universe and human
behavior are inherently uncertain and
indeterminate, law included.’ Specifically, this
author gives as examples several words and
phrases in legal English that she finds ‘vague and
elusive’ such as fair and reasonable, due process
of law, etc. as well as abstract legal expressions
such as justice, due diligence and reasonable
endeavors. Poscher [4], in agreement, notes that
much of the work at high courts is concerned
with disputes created by uncertainty in legal
language:
2. Indeterminacy in Legal Language
Although the highest degree of precision is
expected in legal drafting as a specialized genre,
there is imprecision or uncertainty inherent in
language used in law as characterized by the
indeterminate nature of language in general.
According to Poscher [4], a statute can suffer
from disputes over meaning due to ambiguity
and vagueness as two specific phenomena of
indeterminacy.
2.1. Ambiguity
Basically, a sentence is ambiguous when it
can be interpreted with different possible
meanings [6]. The word bank exemplifies lexical
ambiguity as this homonym can mean both ‘river
bank’ and ‘commercial bank’. There is a large
portion of homonymous words as such in the
English lexicon, and they denote distinct
meanings that can usually be disambiguated by
the context. As in the case of bank, a situation
related to money or payment, by common sense,
will turn our interpretation to ‘commercial bank’
rather than ‘river bank’. Lexical ambiguity, thus,
hardly poses threats to the effectiveness of
everyday communication as well as legal
interpretation.
Significant portions of the institutional legal
system, especially courts at the appellate level
and supreme courts, are for the most part
concerned not with disentangling the facts of
cases but with the indeterminacies of the law.
Such highly developed institutional structures
would not be needed if the law contained only
clear-cut rules establishing precise legal duties
and rights for each case.
Given that law requires clear, precise
meaning to ensure justice and fair application,
the indeterminate nature of language implies a
marked contrast with the nature of law. In
everyday communication, we can overcome
obstacles arising from linguistic uncertainty
through pragmatic strategies. The legal systems,
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More complicated and relevant to legal
borderline cases because we do not know
whether we should apply the expression vehicles
or withhold it. We might have all kinds of
knowledge about kid bicycles or tricycles,
scooters, skateboards, lawnmowers, or
ambulances. Still, these are borderline cases
since it is indeterminate whether they should
be considered “vehicles” within the scope of
this rule.
Poscher [4] notes that different from
ambiguity which speakers can resolve through
context, the uncertainty of meaning in vagueness
is independent of speakers’ competence. Given
the difference between ambiguity and
vagueness, both forms of indeterminacy can be
found in a single expression. A good example is
when a will provides that money will be donated
to “charitable institutions and organizations”
[10]. On the one hand, vagueness is relevant
because questions about borderline cases can
arise as to precisely which entities falls into the
extension of ‘institutions’ or ‘organizations, and
what activities should be considered ‘charitable’.
This expression, on the other hand, is
syntactically ambiguous because it is not certain
as to whether the ‘charitable’ requirement
applies to the adjacent noun only or both that
follow it.
issues is ambiguity that occurs at syntactic level
(amphiboly). Consider, for example, the
sentence ‘the parents of the bride and groom
were waiting outside’. One can understand that
there were up to four people mentioned,
consisting of the bride’s parents and the groom’s
parents. Another possible reading indicates only
three people (the bride’s parents and the groom)
are involved. It is syntactically ambiguous as to
whether the object of preposition in this sentence
involves ‘the bride’ only or extends to ‘groom’
as well. The courts, in reality, have to settle
more disputes concerning syntactic ambiguity
[7,4]. Take the case of California v. Brown as an
example. Giving instruction to the jury, the judge
read: “You must not be swayed by mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.”
Multiple meanings are created in this sentence
concerning the scope of ‘mere’ since it is
uncertain if this adjective modifies only the
adjacent noun or all the subsequent ones. Given
that the precise meaning of jury instruction in
this case is essential in ensuring the defendant’s
right to enlist mercy, the Supreme Court had to
decide if this sentence is ambiguous, and thus,
affecting the jury’s understanding.
Taken together, the indeterminate nature of
language is generally associated with ambiguity
and vagueness. In that sense, the language used
in legal settings is not an exception. While
ambiguity arising from homonyms is rarely a
problem in law, the legal systems more
frequently encounter disputes involving
syntactic ambiguity. Also, a vague expression
can require legal interpretation as to whether a
particular case or entity fits within that (legally
stated) concept.
2.2. Vagueness
As for vagueness, this form of indeterminacy
is more concerned with borderline cases. As
Grice [8] notes, a borderline case occurs when
‘one just does not know whether to apply the
expression or withhold it, and one’s not knowing
is not due to ignorance of the facts.’ A widely
discussed example concerning vagueness is a
hypothetical legal rule: ‘No vehicles in the park’
[9]. Obviously, this rule bars vehicles from the
park, so you cannot drive cars or motorcycles in.
However, does this rule apply to kid bicycles or
tricycles, scooters, and skateboards as well?
Given that this park forbids vehicles, does it
constitute a violation if someone drives a
lawnmower or health workers to enter by an
ambulance to assist an injured person in the
park? Questions as such are concerned with
3. Views and Approaches to Legal Interpretation
Given that linguistic indeterminacy in law is
inevitable, there have been undoubtedly a large
number of disputes over meaning that the legal
systems have to settle. In fact, Justice Scalia of
America noted thirty years ago: “…every issue
N. T. Son / VNU Journal of Science: Legal Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2021) 60-67
63
of law I resolve as federal judge involves
interpretation of text – the text of regulation, or
of a statute, or of the Constitution” [11]. At this
point, it is relevant to examine what methods or
approaches have been mainly discussed in the
history of statutory interpretation.
concept of ‘vehicles’ on the basis of the purpose
and general schemes of the rules. Concerning
how to interpret the expression ‘no later than X
months from the date Y’, Araszkiewicz [5] even
proposes a reasoning model that fixedly
incorporates legislative intent as teleological
argumentation.
3.1. Interpretive Theories
Textualism/ originalism, however, is more
concerned with the ‘plain meaning’ of the
statutory texts [12]. Textualists, like Justice
Although the literature on interpretive
theories identifies three separate approaches
[12], the discussion usually focuses on two
opposing sides: intentionalism/purposivism and
textualism/originalism [13]. As the terms
suggest, interpreters who support the
intentionalist/ purposivist view take into
consideration the legal process in which the
legislature was enacted. The job of interpretation
as deciding what the law means, therefore,
should be based on the original intent of the
drafters or legislators, the legislative history, as
well as what problems the statute was aimed to
address [14]. A well-known case concerning
statutory meaning in this regard is Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, decided in 1892 by
the Supreme Court. The Church had hired an
English pastor, which could have constituted a
violation of a federal law that banned paid
transportation of a person into the U.S. to
perform ‘labor or service of any kind’. At the
heart of the issue is the question as to whether
the expression ‘labor or service of any kind’ in
the statute applied to a religious rector. In a
unanimous decision, among other things, the
Court argued in favor of legislative history,
stating that the law was enacted to prevent
enormous migration of manual workers into the
country rather than a distinguished member of
clergy. In other words, legislative purpose/intent
was used to bolster the Court’s arguments in this
case. In multilingual jurisdiction, purposive
interpretation was also applied as in the EU case
Scalia,
argued
against
intentionalism/
purposivism, claiming that what binds us is the
language of the statute that has been enacted, not
the intent of the lawgivers. Also, legislative
intent is such an elusive concept that we cannot
ascribe a single intent to a body of hundreds of
legislators. Imposing inferences and hypotheses
about what the legislators must have been
thinking at the time of enactment, the judges will
be likely to introduce their own values into the
judging process [13]. Instead, those engaged in
textualism ground their analysis on the ordinary
meaning rule to achieve a ‘fact-based and
objective’ interpretation [15]. Accordingly,
when the statute does not define a term or
expression, its ordinary meaning should come
into play. As an example of textualism/
originalism, consider Smith v. United States,
another widely discussed case that the Supreme
Court decided in 1993. Under a statute that
makes it a crime to use or carry a firearm ‘during
or in relation to…drug trafficking crime’, Smith
was prosecuted as he was caught trading his gun
for cocaine. The task of interpretation in this case
was to decide whether the act of trading a gun for
the drugs falls within the ordinary meaning of
‘use a firearm’. Disagreements occurred among
the justices, the majority of whom adduced
dictionary definitions, determining that what
Smith did constitutes a violation since we can
‘use’ something as tools of barter. The
dissenters, represented by Justice Scalia, argued
that ‘In search for statutory meaning, we give
nontechnical words and phrases their ordinary
meaning…To use an instrumentality ordinarily
means to use it for its intended purpose’ [13].
Thus, speaking of using a gun is most likely to
mean that the gun was used as a weapon, not
Fonden
Marselisborg
Lystbadehavn
v.
Skattenministeriet [10]. Despite the fact that the
case concerns a Danish company and that the
Danish version of the Directive defined
‘vehicles’ as ‘land-based transport on wheels’,
the court decided that ‘boats’ falls within the
N. T. Son / VNU Journal of Science: Legal Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2021) 60-67
64
merely as a thing of value for exchange like
money. As Solan [15] notes, this case, in fact
illustrates the dilemma of ordinary meaning rule.
On the one hand, meaning is ordinary when it fits
the dictionary definitions and speakers’
intuitions in a particular context. To the dissent,
on the other hand, a word means ordinarily if that
sense pops up first in the speakers’ mind,
something closer to prototypical or prevalent
meaning. Textualism/ originalism, all in all,
places a strong emphasis on the plain meaning of
the texts under interpretation.
unambiguous, and the Supreme Court got it right
by rejecting this defence. What is worth noting
is that this decision was not unanimously
reached, with up to four justices incorrectly
finding the language of the statute ambiguous.
The ability to identify ambiguity is part of our
linguistic knowledge, but as this case shows, the
syntax is difficult for non-linguists, even the
brilliant Supreme Court justices. Examining
several cases in which judges failed to make
linguistically correct decisions, Solan [7]
suggests the necessity of linguists as expert
witnesses when it comes to issues decided on
linguistic grounds.
3.2. Linguistic Approaches to Legal Interpretation
From a linguistic perspective, Durant and
Leung [10] present legal interpretation as a
specialized approach that follows strategies in
everyday conversation, noticing both linguistic
and contextual cues like speaker intention.
Accordingly, those engaged in construing law
must take into account not only the linguistic
meaning of the texts but also legal considerations
such as the purpose of the law. Such linguistic
approach, in other words, requires analysis from
a coordination of textualist as well as purposivist
views. Reference to purpose in legal
interpretation is linguistically justified on the
ground that word meaning should be positioned
in a particular context, including the discourse
cues such as the title of the legislative act and the
surrounding words, as well as the relevant
situation or background knowledge in the same
way we interpret utterances in everyday
conversation or casual reading.
As for vagueness in law, the task of deciding
on borderline cases is actually concerned with
the scope of word meaning [10]. Interpretive
issues as to whether X (a reported fact) falls
within Y (a legally stated concept) are,
linguistically speaking, about the sense relation
of hyponymy: Is X a member of a superordinate
Y class? Modern semantic theories such as Katz
and Fodor’s [16] system of semantic features
indicate that ‘a kid tricycle’, while having
wheels, lacks an engine as the essential attribute
of the category ‘vehicles’, explaining why its
meaning can be uncertain in a relevant legal
setting. Based on goodness-of-examplar
In many cases, problems of legal
indeterminacy can be resolved effectively
through linguistic analysis. Linguists such as
Solan [7] and Kaplan [13] claim that certain legal
issues presented to the appeal courts are of
linguistic nature. A good example is the 1984
case United States v. Yermian, in which the
Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, debated
over the scope of adverbs. Yermian, a defense
contractor employee in California, lied in his
security clearance form by hiding his past
conviction for mail fraud. As his false statements
were discovered, he was charged under the
statute that reads: ‘Whoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully…makes
any false statements…shall be fined…or
imprisoned’ (Section 1001 of the federal
Criminal Code). In his defence, Yermian
admitted that he did knowingly make false
statements, but he had no idea that the form
would be sent to the Defense Department. In
other words, he just thought he was making false
statements to his employer, not within the
jurisdiction of a federal agency. At the heart of
his defence is a linguistic question as to whether
the adverbs ‘knowingly’ and ‘willfully’ modify
the prepositional phrase ‘in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any agency of the United States’.
If they do, and this statutory provision is
syntactically ambiguous, the court should apply
the rule of lenity, construing law in favour of the
defendant. However, this structure is
N. T. Son / VNU Journal of Science: Legal Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2021) 60-67
65
characteristics, Rosch’s [17] theory of
prototypes suggests that while both ‘use a gun
for its intended purpose’ and ‘use a gun as tools
for barter’ fall within the concept of ‘use a
firearm’, the former meaning is prototypical or
of core exemplar and the latter is less
representative of the category. These semantic
models of category, in fact, come into play in
interpretive analysis. Still, how do judges decide
which meaning is ordinary as how the word is
most likely understood? Besides individual
intuition and dictionary definitions, Tobia [11]
identifies the pattern of word usage as one of the
most popular sources of evidence. In that sense,
corpus linguistics has been widely discussed as
an empirical tool for identifying the “original
public meaning” [15].
legal system (Civil law tradition), will be
selected for detailed analysis in the current part.
This case was settled by the Polish Supreme
Administrative Court (PSAC) in 2006, with
regard to an indeterminate provision from the
Inheritance and Donation Tax Act of July 28,
1983 (the Act). Although the general rule is that
people who gain property and monetary rights
from inheritance and donation must pay tax,
there are many exemptions one of which is
concerned with housing. Among several
conditions that must be fulfilled for this tax
relief, it is important that the taxpayer does not
dispose of (sell or donate) the inherited property
for the period of five years from the date it is
acquired. The purpose of this condition is to
promote the use of the estate as the residence for
younger generations for at least the prescribed
amount of time. Therefore, if the property is
transferred to a third party in less than five years
from the date of acquisition, it is subject to
taxation since the exemption is no longer
applied. Still, taxpayers can be exempted from
this five-year requirement under the following
provision:
The disposal of acquired property does not
lead to the termination of the exemption if it is
justified by the necessity of a change in living
conditions and if the acquisition of another
building, the acquisition of permission for
building, or the acquisition of a premises takes
place no later than 6 months from the date of
disposal [5].
Put simply, this exception to the five-year
rule requires two conditions that must be jointly
met. Although the first condition can cause
indeterminacy due to the vague term ‘necessity’,
the application of this provision encounters
disputes over the meaning of the second
condition. Blaming the expression ‘no later
than’, Araszkiewicz [5] identifies two possible
readings that are incompatible:
Taken
together,
to
tackle
legal
indeterminacy, the legal systems have engaged
in textualism/ originalism and intentionalism/
purposivism as two opposing approaches,
concerning whether the focus should be placed
on the plain meaning of texts or the legislative
intent. Legal interpretation, on the other hand, is
closely related to the theories of language,
specifically on syntax and semantics.
Linguistically speaking, while textualists
emphasize the examination of linguistic cues,
purposive interpretation pays more attention to
word meaning in the larger context of legislative
history. As a linguistic method, corpus
linguistics has also been useful as a reference
tool for finding ordinary meaning through actual
usage data. What follows is an interpretive case
that practically illustrates how legal arguments
and linguistics can be brought into play to cope
with ambiguity.
4. Case Study
Although most of the cases discussed so far
represent interpretive problems in the American
Common law system, it is not intended to state
that the interface between legal interpretation
and linguistics is little relevant to other legal
traditions. For this reason, a case study under
Polish law, which is based on the continental
i) [acquisition of new property no later than
6
months
after
the
date
of
disposal]ꢀ=ꢀ[acquisition 6 months after the date
of disposal] OR [earlier acquisition].
ii) [acquisition of new property no later than
6
months
after
the
date
of
N. T. Son / VNU Journal of Science: Legal Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2021) 60-67
66
disposal]ꢀ=ꢀ[acquisition 6 months after the date
of disposal] BUT NOT [earlier acquisition].
It is clear from the rule that the owner of an
inherited home can sell it and buy a new one
without losing tax exemption in a period of six
months. However, legal interpretation was
required as to whether this condition allows
(exempted) taxpayers to buy a new home before
transferring the inherited property as well. It is
worth noting that this provision created
considerable disagreements among courts, with
some supporting reading 1 and others arguing in
favour of reading 2. When the case reached
PSAC, the interpretive question was examined
with reference to negative consequences or
legislative intent. Based on the premise that
statutory expressions should be interpreted in a
way that avoids negative consequences, reading
1 was rejected on the ground that this
interpretation allows acquisition of new property
even before the testator is deceased, which is
irrelevant to tax exemption for the acquisition of
property by inheritance. Since the two readings
are contradictory, the rejection of reading 1
results in the adoption of reading 2.
By nature, indeterminacy in this case is
created by syntactic ambiguity (as in previously
discussed cases California v. Brown, United
States v. Yermian). In reading 1, the
prepositional phrase (PP) modifies the preceding
noun phrase (NP) only, constituting the meaning
that a new acquisition of housing can occur after
the date of disposal or earlier. Reading 2,
however, reflects that the whole clause (CL) is
affected by the prepositional phrase, including
‘the acquisition of another building, […]’ which
can only happen after the date of disposal. As
this case law shows, linguistic interpretation
identifies two readings but cannot help decide
which meaning should be accepted. Courts and
legal scholars were all aware of the two
contradictory readings, and it was through legal
arguments (i.e purposivism in this case) with
complicated long legal proceedings that the
dispute could finally be resolved. Nonetheless,
the linguistic analysis could have contributed in
two aspects. Although we all have intuitions
about language, a linguist who is more sensitive
in identifying linguistic issues like syntactic
ambiguity can be of great help when it comes to
reviewing legislative drafts. Also, understanding
the source of ambiguity, a linguist knows how to
fix the indeterminate provision. In this case, the
provision is no longer ambiguous if the
prepositional phrase (the shaded part) is moved
to the front, making the clause newly read as
‘from the date of disposal, the acquistion of
another building, […] takes place no later than
six months’. By doing this, we can eliminate
reading 1 in the texts since its structure blocks
the prepositional phrase within the larger noun
phrase. This is not the case for reading 2 as the
prepositional phrase is free and can move to the
front. Linguistic contribution in this case is, thus,
to ensure the quality of legal drafting so that
legal interpretation will be less a burden for the
legal system.
Although Araszkiewicz [5] attributes
ambiguity to ‘no later than’, linguistically
speaking, it is the scope of ‘from the date of
disposal’ that matters in this case. Thus, the
interpretive question is actually whether this
prepositional phrase modifies the preceding
noun phrase only or the whole clause that
constitutes the second condition. The tree
diagrams below show how the two readings are
differently structured in terms of syntax:
Reading 1
Reading 2
4. Conclusion
The linguistic analysis presented in this
paper demonstrates an interdisciplinary
N. T. Son / VNU Journal of Science: Legal Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2021) 60-67
67
[2] P. Tiersma, Legal Language, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999.
[3] D. Cao, Translating Law, Multilingual Matters,
2007.
contribution to the study of statutory
interpretation, a topic that traditionally falls
within the fields of legal theories, jurisprudence
and philosophy of law. Given that law and
language are closely intertwined, indeterminacy
in law is inherently derived from the
indeterminate nature of language that constitutes
the law. In such regards, both legal studies and
linguistics can offer different methods and
approaches to legal interpretation. While the
legal systems have engaged in textualism/
originalism and intentionalism/purposivism as
two opposing views, depending on whether the
focus should be placed on the plain meaning of
texts or the legislative intent, construing law is
also relevant to the linguistic theories of syntax
and semantics. In search for ordinary meaning,
the textualists or originalists have additionally
found corpus linguistics useful as a reference
tool through actual usage data. Practically, the
Polish case study on interpreting an ambiguous
provision has given insights into how legal
argumentation and syntactic analysis can interact
to offer a joint solution. All of this suggests that
both legal reasoning and linguistics should be
brought into play to cope with legal
indeterminacy. As shown in the case study,
whereas legal reasoning helps to select the
preferred interpretation that suits the legislative
intent and avoids negative consequences,
linguistic analysis can detect the source of
indeterminacy and guide statutory review as well
as amendments.
[4] R. Poscher, Ambiguity and vagueness in legal
interpretation, in: P. Tiersma, L. Solan (Eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of Language and Law, Oxford
University Press, 2016, pp. 128-144.
[5] M. Araszkiewicz, Argument structures in legal
interpretation: balancing and thresholds, in: T.
Bustamante, C. Dahlman (Eds.), Argument Types
and Fallacies in Legal Argumentation. Law and
Philosophy Library, vol 112, Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2015, pp. 129-150.
[6] E. Finegan, Language its Structure and Use,
seventh ed., Cengage Learning, 2015.
[7] L. Solan, Does the legal system need experts in
English syntax?, in: R. Rieber, W. Stewart (Eds),
The Language Scientist as Expert in the Legal
Setting – Issues in Forensic Linguistics, Annals of
The New York Academy of Sciences 606 (1990)
107-118.
6632.1990.tb37739.x
[8] P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, Havard
University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
[9] H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, second ed.,
Oxford University Press, Claredon, 1994.
[10] A. Durant, J. Leung, Language and Law – A
Resource Book for Students, Routledge, 2016.
[11] K. Tobia, Testing ordinary meaning: an
experimental assessment of what dictionary and
linguistic usage data tell legal interpreters, 34
Harv. L. Rev. 726, 2020.
[12] W. Eskridge, P. Frickey, E. Garette, Legislation
and Statutory Interpretation, second ed.,
Foundation Press, 2007.
[13] J. Kaplan, Linguistics and Law, Routledge, 2020.
[14] H. Hart, A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law,
tenth ed., Unpub. MS, 1958.
Acknowledgments
[15] L. Solan, Corpus linguistics as a method of legal
interpretation: some progress, some questions,
International Journal for the Semiotic of Law 33
020-09707-8
I gratefully thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tammy
Gales (Hofstra University, USA) for her
comments and encouragement during the time
this manuscript was prepared as an independent
research paper in her class. My gratitude also
extends to the anonymous reviewers for their
constructive recommendations that greatly
contribute to the improvement of my work.
[16] J. Katz, J. Fodor, The structure of a semantic
theory,
Language 39
(1963)
170-210.
[17] E. Rosch, Principles of categorization, in: E.
Rosch, B. Lloyd (Eds.) Cognition and
Categorization, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Hillsdale, 1978, pp.27-48.
References
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Resource Publications, 1963.
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