Hành vi hối lộ, tiếp cận tín dụng, sức mạnh đàm phán của doanh nghiệp và sức ép cạnh tranh trên thị trường: Bằng chứng từ số liệu doanh nghiệp đa quốc gia
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BRIBERY, CREDIT ACCESS, BARGAINING POWER
AND MARKET COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM
CROSS-COUNTRY FIRM-LEVEL DATA
HÀNH VI HỐI LỘ, TIẾP CẬN TÍN DỤNG, SỨC MẠNH ĐÀM PHÁN
CỦA DOANH NGHIỆP VÀ SỨC ÉP CẠNH TRANH
TRÊN THỊ TRƯỜNG: BẰNG CHỨNG TỪ SỐ LIỆU
DOANH NGHIỆP ĐA QUỐC GIA
Dr. Le Thanh Ha; Dao Hanh Le; Nguyen Ngoc Mai
National Economics University
Abstract
This paper used the multi-country firm-level data covering 104 countries for the period
from 2010 to 2019 to investigate the effects of bribery on credit access for firms holding bargain-
ing power and/or facing market competition. We used firms’size and legal status to capture their
bargaining power, while the levels of market competition were analyzed according to the number
of competitors in the same working field. Our empirical results provided evidence to support the
“greasing-the-wheels-of-credit access” hypothesis. Furthermore, the effects of bribery become
stronger for larger-sized or formally-registered firms, and those facing no market competition.
These effects also become pronounced if we controlled the endogeneity problem.
Keywords: Bribery, Credit Access, Bargaining Power, Market Competition, Cross-country
Firm-level.
Tóm tắt
Nghiên cứu này sử dụng dữ liệu doanh nghiệp đa quốc gia, bao gồm 104 quốc gia trong
giai đoạn từ 2010 tới 2019 để nghiên cứu tác động của hành vi đút lót tới việc tiếp cận tài chính
của doanh nghiệp sở hữu sức mạnh đàm phán và/hoặc hoạt động trên thị trường có nhiều cạnh
tranh. Chúng tôi sử dụng kích thước doanh nghiệp và trạng thái pháp lý để ghi nhận sức mạnh
đàm phán của doanh nghiệp, trong khi chúng tôi sử dụng thông tin về số lượng đối thủ cạnh
tranh trên cùng lĩnh vực để đánh giá mức độ cạnh tranh trên thị trường mà doanh nghiệp hoạt
động. Kết quả thực nghiệm chỉ ra bằng chứng ủng hộ giả thuyết bôi trơn để được tiếp cận các
nguồn tài chính, tín dụng. Ngoài ra, tác động của hành vi đút lót trở nên mạnh hơn đối với
doanh nghiệp có quy mô lớn hoặc doanh nghiệp đăng ký kinh doanh chính thức, hoặc doanh
nghiệp không bị sức ép cạnh tranh quá lớn. Tác động cũng trở nên mạnh hơn khi cúng tôi kiểm
soát vấn đề nội sinh.
Từ khóa: Hối lộ, tiếp cận tín dụng, sức mạnh đàm phán của doanh nghiệp, cạnh tranh
trên thị trường 1.
1. Introduction
Undoubtedly, a capital plays an essential role for firms in contributing to the sustainable
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growth and efficiency in firms’ operation activities, along with labors and technology (Aghion
and Howitt, 2007). In addition to equity capital, firms use debt capital such as bank credit for
their business activities. Accordingly, the access conditions to bank credit are important for the
survival and development of both small-medium sized (SMEs) and large firms (Levine et al.,
2000). Specifically, the micro and small firms make up for a large proportion of the developing
economy (De Mel et al., 2009; Nichter and Goldmark, 2009) and financial constraints are con-
sidered as a major obstacle for their daily business operations (Ayyagari et al., 2008; Beck and
Demirguc-Kunt, 2008). However, the rigid financial system can create lots of challenges for
firm to meets the conditions of financial institutions to issue the loans (Liu et al., 2020). Under
this circumstance, firms may experience inefficient resource allocations and show the poor per-
formance.
In many countries, the government interferes in the economy by laws or regulations, there-
fore, the quality of institutional environment not only plays an important role in credit market
but also affect firms’credit registrations (Galli et al., 2017). A great deal of papers studies the de-
terminants of the quality of institutional environment such as performance in practicing laws (La
Porta et al., 1997; Djankov et al., 2008). Firms may face difficulties to satisfy the requirements
stemming from legal regulations requested by the government. Under this circumstance, paying
bribes, with hardly any other choice is considered as a strategic behavior that allows firms to
avoid the constraints from both the governments and banks (Zhou and Peng, 2012). Since bribery
often happens in countries where the government involves in the economy (Klitgaard, 1988) or
public servants possess low wages (Kraay and Van Rijckeghem, 1995), bribery can be served as
a powerful tool for firms to help them to connect with public officials, then control their private
benefits (Martin et al., 2007).
In the literature, prior scholars have investigated the association between bribery and credit
access. For example, Fungacova et al. (2015) provided empirical results that bribery has signif-
icantly positive impacts on total firms’ bank debt in the short-term but negative impact in the
long-term. Şeker and Yang (2014) claim that making informal payments such as bribery may cre-
ate bigger burdens on the development of SMEs. Along with lending process, corruption can
occur when firms bribe bank officials to achieving loans (Beck et al., 2006). In this spirit, bribing
amount is seen as tax on firms, causing a barrier to get credit. In the same vein, Qi and Ongena
(2018) and Wellalage and Locke (2019) indicates that bribery is detrimental for firms in accessing
the credit. In contrast, some scholars have provided empirical results that bribery has a positive
impact on firms’chance of getting credit (Weill, 2011; Chen et al., 2013). It can be seen that find-
ings of pre-existing papers have not consolidated about whether bribery has a positive or negative
impact on firm’s credit access.
Our paper also examines the relationship between bribery and firms’credit access but crit-
ically aims at closing the gap in the literature by two dimensions. First, we scrutinize to provide
an apparent conclusion on the effects of bribery on firms’credit access by using the cross-country
firm level data as opposed to the empirical evidence in a typical country provided by previous
studies. Second, we contribute to the literature by providing an argument that the impacts of
bribery on credit access are conditional on firms’ bargaining power and level of market compe-
tition. Put it differently, the effects of bribery are various among different situations. In terms of
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bargaining power, in accordance with the analysis by Nguyen et al. (2020), we assume that a
firm’s bargaining power is shaped by its competency and substitutes to bribes. Correspondingly,
firms’ size and legality are applied to capture their bargaining power. Zhou and Peng (2012) de-
bated that firms with weak bargaining power need to pay bribes for their survival, whilst firms
with stronger bargaining power are more likely to achieve more benefits from their paid bribes
(Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Based on this discussion, we formulate our hypothesis about effect of
bribery on firm credit access under the moderation of firms’ bargaining power. In the aspect of
level of market competition, it is believed that higher level of market competition leads to fewer
benefits in firms’ paying bribes (Malesky et al., 2020). Under this circumstance, firms need to
pay a higher amount of bribery in order to keep in touch with officials (Rose-Ackerman, 1978;
Diably and Sylwester, 2015) and pay higher extra charges due to the less predictable environment
(Malesky et al., 2020). In reference to this discussion, we develop our hypothesis about moder-
ating effect of levels of market competition over the relationship between bribery and firms’credit
accessibility.
In the present article, we employed a probit method for the firm-level cross-country data
including 104 countries during the 2010-2019 period to examine the effects of bribery on firms’
credit access and our proposed hypotheses, which contemplates the moderating effects of firms’
bargaining power and the levels of market competition. We measured the bribery as the percentage
of annual sales paid as informal payment to public officials, and generated dummy variable to
twig the extent of bribery. In addition, we categorized firms by size as SMEs and large-sized
firms based on the definition of World Bank Enterprise Survey. Dummy variable for firms’ legal
status was also created. The levels of market competition were analyzed according to the number
of competitors in the same working field. As mentioned in the literature, since there might be re-
verse causality between bribery and credit accessibility, the bribery variable may be endogenous
and lead to biased estimation results. Hence, we applied the instrumental variable (IV) method
to address this endogeneity problem.
To our best knowledge, our paper is the first to scrutinize the relationship between bribery
and firms’credit accessibility under the moderation of firms’bargaining power and levels of mar-
ket competition. The results of our benchmark model pointed out evidence to reinforce our hy-
pothesis that firms’bribery of public officials is positively related with firms’credit access. Also,
the estimation results of sub-sample by size and by legality also suggested that the effect of bribery
is more sizable for larger-sized firms or formally-registered firms. The estimation results sub-
sample by market competition demonstrate that the market competition negatively moderates the
association between bribery and firms’credit access. Lastly, the effect of bribery becomes stronger
under the management for the endogeneity issue.
The remainder of the paper is illustrated according to the following organizations. Related
studies and hypothesis development are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 illustrates the data used
in this paper. Section 4 performs the development of a model for enterprises at the cross-country
firm-level data to determine a myriad of factors influencing firms’ credit accessibility. The em-
pirical results are reported in Section 5. The conclusions and policy implications are provided in
Section 6.
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2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development
2.1. Bribery and firm credit access
Bribery of public officials is more likely to happen in countries where there are govern-
ment’s interventions in economy in terms of licenses or restrictions, which turns out to enhance
the power of public officials in practicing regulations (Klitgaard, 1988). In addition, the rigid fi-
nancial system can create lots of challenges for firm to meets the conditions of financial institu-
tions to issue the loans (Liu et al., 2020). Under this circumstance, these firms need to select a
strategic behavior to maintain the relationship with official in order to overcome these difficulties.
As argued by Cai et al. (2011), bribery allow firms to obtain this goal. In this article, we expect
that paying bribes increases firms’ accessibility to credit. There are plausible reasons to explain
our belief.
First, the government acts as a tangible hand in helping financial institutions to reduce
problems about corporate moral hazard (La Porta et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2006); thus, has strong
impact on banks’loans. As a result, firms can use distortive behaviors such as bribery to provoke
public officials to abuse their reputations and authorities to control privately beneficial effects
(Martin et al., 2007). For example, firms use bribery of public officials to take advantage over
their competitors to obtain government contracts or be in governmental support programs as an
award from the public officials for paying the highest bribery (Beck and Maher, 1986; Martin et
al., 2007). This discussion implies that bribery can be served for buying judicial decisions or
eliminating barriers that prevent firms from accessing to credit (Rose-Ackerman, 1998).
Second, the red tape of financial institutions increases due to information asymmetry, which
may lead to credit allocation inefficiency and higher transaction costs (Liu et al., 2020). Paying
bribes can help firms to decrease the consequences of red tape and improve the likelihood of ob-
taining bank loans (Fungacova et al., 2015). Additionally, Lui (1985) and Levine et al. (2000)
contend that the rigidity of financial system can be softened, the cumbersome credit procedures
can be simplified, the loan approval waiting time can be reduced for firms that accept to pay
bribes.
On the contrary, some scholars argue that bribery may be an obstacle in accessibility to
credit of enterprises. It is illustrated that bank officers due to asymmetric information in lending
process, bank officers often have permissions in determining credit terms like collateral types or
interest rates (Barth et al., 2009), which leads to bribe from firms to break the barriers or avoid
difficult terms and motivates officers to make up sophisticated credit terms to achieve more
bribery (Guriev, 2004). This may lead to the fact that the number of non-performing loans in-
creases due to firms’ bankrupt and reduce banks’ willingness to lend, which prevent firms from
getting credit from banks. Additionally, banks’ severe credit terms to avoid default such as high
interest rates make it harder for firm to get credit because of higher borrowing costs and more fi-
nancial constraints (Beck et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2009), preventing low-risk borrowers, but en-
couraging higher-risk borrowers to borrow and raising the risk of debt recovery. Hence, it is
tougher for firms to access to credit.
Overall, it is likely that bribery reduces credit constraints and helps firms obtain bank loans
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whereas the relationship between banks and firms is promoted by corruption. Accordingly, we
propose the following hypothesis:
H1: Firms’ bribery of public officials is positively associated with firm credit access.
2.2. Moderating Effects of Bargaining Power
Prior scholars such as Bliss and Tella (1997) and Fisman and Svensson (2007) contend that
the bargaining power of firms determine the effects of bribery. In the similar spirit, we also argue
that firms’ bargaining power influence their ability to reduce the payment amount and negotiate
for better benefit (Rose-Ackerman, 1978), therefore moderate the association between bribery
and credit access. In this paper, we employ firms’ size and legal status (formal and informal reg-
istration) to capture their bargaining power vis-à-vis public officials.
2.3. Firm size and benefit of bribes
As discussed by Rose-Ackerman (1978), the larger-sized firms are more likely to earn more
benefit from their paid bribes. That is due to the fact that the local government prefers the large-
sized firms since these firms with stronger financial and technical capacities tend to create more
jobs and have more tax contributions. Furthermore, the large-sized firms have closed connections
with political agents (Zhou and Peng, 2012), thus reduce the probability of paying “extortion”
bribes and enhance the likelihood of accessing to more “lucrative business opportunities” (Nguyen
et al., 2017). Hence, firms with a larger size are more likely to engage in benefit-seeking bribes
and receive more preferential treatments. The more preferential treatments may help these firms
to overcome the cumbersome credit procedures and reduce the loan approval waiting. Moreover,
Wellalage et al. (2019) also reveal that the larger-size firms may be able to avoid the “loop-holes”
and find an alternative way to address cumbersome situations. Moreover, transactional techniques
based on verifiable hard information and more privilege lending relationships with larger and
more transparent firms are more likely to be applied by large banks (Stein, 2002). Specifically,
the firm size can impact the probability of bankruptcy since they are more diversified and harder
to fail (Honhyan, 2009). That implies that they would have more opportunities to raise capital.
Therefore, the firm size moderates the association between bribery and credit access. We hypoth-
esize:
H2: The effect of bribery on firm credit access is greater for large-sized firms.
2.4. Firm legality and benefit of bribes
Informal (or unregistered) firms are seen potentially as productive as formal (or registered)
firms. However, unregistered firms are believed to face constraints such as lack of access to
formal loans or public services (Farazi, 2014), which prevents them from growing up (De Soto,
1989, 2000). Informal firms are likely to avoid taxes, however, have fewer chances to get access
to formal loans or access to framework of legal protection supported by the government (Aureo
de Paula and Scheinkman, 2007) or even government finance support due to institutional con-
straints (Rothenberf et al., 2016). In this article, there are several reasons to make us believe that
informal firms have very low bargaining power.
First, since informal firms are usually recognized as very small firms (Farazi, 2014; Rothen-
berf et al., 2016), they have lower bargaining power. Therefore, they earn fewer benefits from
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their bribery actions as our argument about the association between firm size and benefits of
bribes. Second, financial markets play important role in production activities both in the short-
term and long-term investment. Their efficiency depends importantly on financial institutions,
which connect lenders and borrowers by providing information to both sides at an acceptable re-
payment rate. Hence, the financial institutions may reduce default and help to promote juridical
credit return or guarantees (Pagano, 2001). This leads to the fact that these institutions require
borrowers to provide sophisticated documents such as records about banking operations or fi-
nancial statements, which tend to reject informal firms due to their lack of motivation to suffer
additional costs for bank accounts or financial statements (Straub, 2005). Impossibility of bor-
rowing formal loans raise the needs by informal firms either to find informal loans from informal
resources or to pay bribes to bureaucrats to overcome the barriers created by financial institutions.
They lead to higher costs for seeking credit and higher bribery costs due to uncertainty for infor-
mal firms. Additionally, informal firms always participate in small trading, illegal market activities
and tax nonpayment. Bases on the above discussion, we hold strong belief that legal registration
positively moderate the relationship between bribery and firms’ credit access. We come up with
the following hypothesis:
H3: The effect of bribery on firm credit access is greater for formally-registered firms.
2.5. Moderating Effects of Market Competition
In the literature, prior scholars have indicated two lines of thought guiding the firms’bribery
behavior, including the social norm view and the rent-seeking view. The former argues that the
purpose of paying bribes regarded as an accepted norm in the business environment (Sundström,
2019) is to gain legitimacy and survive by conforming the accepted rules (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983), while the latter emphasizes on the expected abnormal rents (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Al-
though there are differences in explaining the firm’s bribery behavior, these two streams have af-
firmed that the increased competition among firms affects the choice of whether firms engage in
bribery.
In this article, we argue that the rise in firms’ competition in the market can influence the
effects of bribery on firms’ability in accessing credit. The reasons are as follows. First, according
to the social norm view, the increase in competitors in the operating environment where bribery
is accepted as a normal social norm may cause firms to pay more bribes to maintain the relation-
ship with the bureaucrats (Malesky et al., 2020). These higher bribe amounts stem from a reduc-
tion in the firm bargaining power vis-à-vis to public officials due to the highly competitive
business environment (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Moreover, Galang (2012) states that a diminish
in firms’ bargaining power also implies that firms may receive less preferential treatments and
greater transaction costs. Therefore, the advantages over competitors because of paying bribes
can reduce in the more competitive business environment. Second, we follow North (1990) and
Williamson (2000) to base on the rent-seeking view to contend that the impacts of market com-
petition on the relationship between bribery and firms’ credit access are conditional on the pre-
dictability level of policy. Specifically, firms have more opportunities to access credit if the
environment is less predictable (Galang, 2012; Zhou et al., 2013). Conversely, firms in the less
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predictable environment may have to pay additional costs (Malesky et al., 2020). The market
competition leads to more policy uncertainty (Alexeev and Song, 2013), thus influences the pre-
dictability level of policy implementation. Accordingly, the firms’ accessibility of credit is more
likely to decrease in the highly competitive business environment. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H4: The market competition negatively moderates the association between bribery and
firms’ credit access.
We summarize our theoretical framework in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Theoretical framework.
3. Data Description
This paper used cross-sectional data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey. The data
cleaning was carried out by getting rid of missing observations and outliers and keeping the data
of manufacturing firms corresponding to trade theory. There are total 24,661 observations cov-
ering 104 countries for the period from 2010 to 2019.
Dependent variable: CA
CA is a dichotomous variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm get credit access and
0 otherwise. There are about 38.86% of firms getting credit in our sample.
Key independent variable: DBri and Bri.
Bri is the natural logarithm of the percentage of annual sales paid as informal payment
to public officials, and DBri is the dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm involves
in bribery activities, and 0 otherwise.
Table 1 shows that there are hardly any differences between non-credit-access firms and
credit-access firms in using bribery in our database.
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Table 1: Comparisons of credit access vs. non-credit access
Variable
DBri
Non-CA
0.115
CA
0.117
0.186
2.512
Bri
0.193
Briamount
1.262
ource: Authors’calculation
In Table 2, the data were separated into various groups to analyze the moderating effects
of bargaining power on the relationship between bribery and credit access. Institutional constraints
used in this paper is gathered from firms’ opinion about the level of obstacles influencing their
business: corruption, political instability, tax administrations, and business licensing and permits.
Panel A indicates that larger firms with higher bargaining power are more likely to get ac-
cess to credit. For “Credit Access only” category, unlike 23.94% of small firms and 35.19% of
medium firms, 46.25% of large-sized firms access to credit. Also, for “credit access and bribery”,
larger firms still have higher percentage. However, for “bribery only”, large-sized firms account
for only 4.99% while small and medium firms account for 8.93% and 7.43% respectively, which
implies that larger firms use less bribe. In the following analysis, we concentrate on firms’ legal
status. As described in Table 2, the proportion of informal firms getting access to credit is lower,
but the fraction of paying-bribe firms is higher than the formal ones. Roughly 23% of informal
firms get access to credit, but about 33.96% of formal firms get access to credit without bribery.
Also, for “bribery without credit access”, although informal firms account for 11.86%, the formal
ones only account for 7.32%, which implies that informal firms need to bribe not only for credit
access but also for other issues.
Panel B describes firms with and without market competition and level of market compe-
tition associated with bribery and credit access. It can be observed that firms without market com-
petition have more opportunities in accessing to credit than those with market competition
(47.82% comparing to 38.81%). However, bribery hardly changes along with market competition.
For level of market competition, it is also shown that firms with lower competition-level are easier
in credit access (60.37% comparing to 33.69%) and bribery remains stable in this situation.
Table 2: Percentages of credit access and bribery firms (%)
Panel A: Bargaining power (%)
CA & Bribery
CA only
Small Medium Large
Total Formal Informal Total
23.94
4.02
8.93
63.11
100
35.19
5.28
7.43
52.10
100
46.25
6.09
4.99
42.66
100
33.86
5.02
7.37
53.75
100
33.96
5.04
7.32
53.68
100
23.31
3.39
33.86
5.02
7.37
53.75
100
CA and bribery
Bribery only
No CA & no bribery
Total
11.86
61.44
100
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Panel B: Market competition (%)
Market Competition
CA & Bribery
CA only
No
43.15
4.67
7.61
44.67
100
Yes
33.78
5.03
7.37
53.83
100
Total
33.86
5.02
Low
52.70
7.67
5.02
34.62
100
High
29.30
4.39
Total
33.86
5.02
CA and Bribery
Bribery only
No CA & no bribery
Total
7.37
7.94
7.37
53.75
100
58.38
100
53.75
100
Source: Authors’calculation
Control variables
Our control variables used in this paper are relied on the list of control variables made by
Wellalage et al. (2020). Annual sale per labor () refers to firm’s business performance during a
fiscal year. As firms with better performance are likely to pay back loans easier, they have higher
chance to get credit. and are the firm’s age and the experience in this firm’s working sector.
Older firms are more knowledgeable; hence, they are easier in approaching credit. We also ex-
pected that higher managing experience helps firms to deal with credit accessing processes and
raise the chance to obtain credit. Size, expressing the scale-effect, displays the number of em-
ployees. Larger firms are predicted to have higher ability in credit access. and represents the
percent of a firm owned by the Government (or State) and by foreign companies, respectively.
takes the value of 1 if a firm involves in direct export activities and 0 otherwise. takes the value
of 1 if a firm carried out research and development activities and 0 otherwise. The summary sta-
tistics for all sample and sub-sample are described in Table 3.
Table 3: Control variables
All sample
CA=0
CA=1
Obs
Mean Std. Dev Obs
Mean
Obs
2.47
0.77
0.66
Mean Std. Dev
Std. Dev
LnSalecap
LnAge
24,661
24,661
13.43
2.80
2.82
2.63 15073 13.14
9588
9588
9588
13.90
2.92
2.92
2.81
0.77
0.63
0.77 15073
0.65 15073
2.72
2.75
LnManager 24,661
Size
24,661 112.28 237.66 15073 88.22 206.48 9588 150.116 375.528
Export
RD
24,661
24,661
24,661
24,661
0.23
0.27
0.00
0.06
0.42 15073
0.44 15073
0.02 15073
0.22 15073
0.17
0.20
0.00
0.06
0.37
0.40
0.02
0.22
9588
9588
9588
9588
0.34
0.38
0.00
0.07
0.47
0.48
0.01
0.23
State
Foreign
Source: Authors’calculation
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The correlation matric between the key variables in this paper is described in Table 4. Most
of the correlation coefficients are seen to be lower than 0.4. Moreover, the higher-than-0.4
correlation coefficient belongs to those between dichotomous variables about firms’bribe paying
and the bribe payment amount. Hence, there is no problem with multicollinearity in our
regressions.
Table 4: Correlation matrix
DBri Bri Export RD LnSalecap State Foreign LnAge LnManager Size
DBri
Bri
1.00
0.88 1.00
Export
RD
0.00 0.00 1.00
0.00 0.01 0.16
1.00
0.08
0.00
0.06
0.10
0.04
0.16
LnSalecap -0.02 -0.03 0.02
1.00
-0.00
0.03
0.07
-0.00
0.04
State
0.02 0.03 0.03
0.01 0.01 0.21
-0.01 -0.02 0.13
1.00
0.01
0.03
Foreign
LnAge
1.00
0.00
1.00
LnManager -0.02 -0.03 0.09
-
-0.02 -0.00 -0.39
0.09 0.21 0.17
1.00
0.04
Size
-0.01 0.01 0.31
1.00
Source: Authors’calculation
4. Model Specification
The benchmark model is specified as follows:
CA = βo + β1Bribery + β2CONTROL + v c + λ + ε
i
(1)
i
i
i
o
t
where subscript i, c, and t denote firm, country, and year, respectively. and are, in turn, country
and year fixed effects. is the credit access of firm i. is a set of bribery variables. is a set of
control variables. is an error term. As is a binary variable, we applied the probit method to es-
timate equation (1). We reported the marginal effects at the mean level. The country fixed effects,
, were used to reflect the unobservable factors that are specific to countries. In addition, as the
data in our sample were collected in different years, the year fixed effects were used to capture
the macroeconomic variables of the world economy which change over time and affect all firms.
We first tested the association between bribery and firm credit access. Since we proposed
that this relationship may depend on a firm’s bargaining power, we re-regressed the equation (1)
in the sub-sample based on firm size and legal status. In addition to a firm’s bargaining power,
we also investigated the moderating effects of market competition. We compared the effects of
bribery on credit access probability for the sub-sample of firms facing competition of others in
the market and those having no market competition. For further analysis, we also consider the
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effects of market competition level. In particular, we define the low and high level of market
competition and then also re-estimated the equation (1) with the sub-sample of each level. The
interactions between market competition and the firm’s size were also examined. In the further
analysis, we have investigated the effect of bribery on firm credit access across sectors.
In our model, there is a simultaneity between bribery and firm credit access that may cause
our results to be biased. On the one hand, paying bribes increases firms’ accessibility to credit.
According to Rose-Ackerman (1998), firms use bribery to buy judicial decisions or eliminate
barriers preventing firms from credit access. Banks or financial institutions may expand the ability
of credit access for firms who are willing to pay bribes. Moreover, paying bribes can help firms
to decrease the consequences of information asymmetry and improve the likelihood of obtaining
bank loans (Fungacova et al., 2015). On the other hand, corruption encourages credit constraints
and built the impediments of firm financing (Qi and Ongena, 2019). This is on the grounds that
in a corrupt lending process, bank officials pick firms who are ready to pay bribes instead of
credible ones. Difficulties get worse for SMEs that are contingent upon limited financial re-
sources. These discussions support the view that there is an association between firm credit access
and bribery.
To mitigate the consequences, we used the instrumental variable (IV) method to address
the endogeneity bias between the credit constraint proxy and DBri and Bri variables. Following
Fisman and Svensson (2007) and Nguyen et al. (2017), the sector-location average approach is
employed to fix the issue of endogeneity bias. According to Qi and Ongena (2018), firm bribery
is averaged across other firms within the same locality and sector but excludes the firm itself. As
a result, the sector-location average of bribery payment amount, which is exogenous to the firm,
specified by the business method of the sector and the rent-seeking ability of the bureaucrats.
More clearly, instrumenting bribery by the bribery payment amount denoted by GBri_ivb and
GBri_ivr can minimize omitted unobservable errors related with bribe intensity at the firm, but
not the sector level. Johnson et al. (2000) utilize the judiciary system as a proxy for the quality
of property rights since fairness and how it could affect business is another instrument for bribery.
Accordingly, this study uses Weak_judiciary as an instrument for Bri due to firm credit access
depending on the degree of judiciary system fairness. The instrument Weak_judiciary refers to
firm’s attitude toward level of judiciary system corruption, based on a question: “The court system
is fair, impartial and uncorrupted”.
5. Estimation Results
5.1. Main Results
Column 1-6 of Table 5 presents the estimation results of bribery on firm credit access. More
specifically, loans of firms from distinct sources, including private banks and from state banks
are shown in columns 1-2, 3-4 and 5-6, respectively. In this analysis, we use the dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if firms pay bribes (DBri) and the bribery payment amount that is a share
of revenue (Bri) paid as informal payment to public officials. The results show that there is a pos-
itive relationship between bribery and firm credit access. Firms’ bribery of public officials in-
creases the probability of credit access to both private and public banks by 0.23%. Engaging in
greasing bribery to get things done with regard to licenses, taxes, regulations, or services in private
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banks increases the probability of accessing to external finance from private banks by 0.20%.
We also observe the similar evidence when using the bribery payment amount. In particular, the
higher share of sales paid as greasing bribery increases the probability of credit access by 9%
and 8% in all banks and in private banks, respectively. These findings are consistent with those
of Chen at al. (2013) and Liu et al. (2020), who observed a positive link between the amout of
bribes and external credit access. Li et al. (2008) and Faccio (2010) also provide the similar find-
ing and contend that firms can use bribery to overcome market failures and eliminate ideological
discriminations to access banks loans. However, the result of bribery on firm’s accessing to fi-
nance provided by state banks is statistically insignificant in our database.
Regarding the effects of other control variables on firm credit access, a statistically signif-
icant positive relationship is found between exporting firms and credit access. The table reports
that export firms are approximately 0.32% less credit constraint than non-exporters. The result is
the same for firms having R&D activities. The sale intensity per labor (Lnsalecap) and the firm
age (Lnage) are positive and statistically significant, whereas the foreign linkages (Foreign) and
the relationship with state sectors (State) reduce the probability of firms’credit access in our the-
oretical model. That is due to the fact that firms having relationships with state sectors often have
more external financing channels than those without this connection since they can achieve more
government shelters and soft budget constraints. Furthermore, the results also indicate a positive
link between the firm size measured by the number of full-time employees (Size) and their credit
accessibility, which aligns with Rose-Ackerman (1978). As revealed by Gonzalez (2015), small
firms often encounter more financing constraints and have difficulties in accessing the formal fi-
nancial system, therefore banks’ preferences have larger effects on them. Our results are aligned
with Liu et al. (2020). The positive coefficient of LnAge implies that older firms are more likely
to get access to finance as a result of knowledge and experience accumulation over the years.
The more experienced managers have higher capacities of negotiating and persuading partners,
which explains why the relationship between the working experience of top managers and credit
access in all banks except for private banks is positive.
Table 5: Benchmark estimation results
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
All
Private Banks
State Banks
DBri
Bri
0.23***
0.20***
0.07
0.09***
(0.017)
0.08***
(0.018)
0.01
(0.028)
(0.031)
0.32***
(0.022)
0.32***
(0.024)
(0.034)
0.27***
(0.025)
0.26***
(0.026)
(0.047)
0.22***
(0.030)
0.27***
(0.034)
RD
0.32***
(0.022)
0.32***
(0.024)
0.27***
(0.025)
0.26***
(0.026)
0.22***
(0.030)
0.27***
(0.034)
Export
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LnSalecap
State
0.10***
(0.007)
-0.44
0.10***
(0.007)
-0.42
0.13***
(0.008)
-1.19**
(0.536)
-0.33***
(0.047)
0.06***
(0.015)
-0.01
0.13***
(0.008)
-1.16**
(0.535)
-0.34***
(0.047)
0.06***
(0.015)
-0.01
0.04***
(0.010)
0.87
0.04***
(0.010)
0.88
(0.449)
-0.40***
(0.045)
0.04***
(0.014)
0.07***
(0.016)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.21***
(0.186)
23,317
0.196
(0.447)
-0.40***
(0.044)
0.04***
(0.014)
0.07***
(0.016)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.20***
(0.186)
23,317
0.195
(0.566)
-0.46***
(0.079)
-0.02
(0.566)
-0.46***
(0.079)
-0.02
Foreign
LnAge
(0.020)
0.19***
(0.025)
0.00
(0.020)
0.19***
(0.024)
0.00
LnManager
Size
(0.018)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.57***
(0.209)
23,281
0.307
(0.018)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.56***
(0.209)
23,281
0.307
(0.000)
-3.11***
(0.340)
22,062
0.186
(0.000)
-3.10***
(0.339)
22,062
0.186
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We then re-investigated the moderating effects of firm size on the relationship between
bribery and firm credit access by regressing the data in sub-samples by size, with a focus on small
and medium-sized (SMEs) and large-sized firms. A firm is defined as small or medium if it has
fewer than 100 employees, while a large firm has more than 99 workers, according to the defini-
tion of the Enterprise Survey. Columns 1–4 of Table 6 present our estimation results. The effects
of greasing bribery on firm credit access differ in relation to a firm’s size. Paying greasing bribery
raises the ability of firms to access finance in both SMEs and large-sized firms. However, these
effects become more prominent for the large-sized firms when using both variables DBri and
Bri. In particular, the large-sized firms’ bribery of public officials increases the probability of
credit access by 0.38%, as compared to the 0.18% estimated for the sub-sample of SMEs. Simi-
larly, the higher percentage of total annual sales paid as informal payments by SMEs and large-
sized firms raises the credit access probability by 9% and 14%, respectively. These empirical
results support the hypothesis H2 that the effect of bribery on firm credit access is greater for
large-sized firms due to their strong bargaining power.
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Table 6: Estimation results of sub-sample by size
(1)
(2)
(3)
(3)
VARIABLES
SMEs
Large
SMEs
Large
DBri
Bri
0.18***
(0.035)
0.38***
(0.069)
0.09***
(0.019)
0.27***
(0.027)
0.18***
(0.032)
0.10***
(0.009)
-0.82
0.14***
(0.040)
0.33***
(0.040)
0.32***
(0.039)
0.08***
(0.014)
-0.90
RD
0.27***
(0.027)
0.18***
(0.032)
0.10***
(0.009)
-0.80
0.33***
(0.040)
0.31***
(0.040)
0.08***
(0.014)
-0.97*
Export
LnSalecap
State
(0.772)
-0.43***
(0.068)
-0.03**
(0.017)
0.09***
(0.019)
0.01***
(0.000)
-2.33***
(0.359)
17,446
(0.581)
-0.54***
(0.063)
0.11***
(0.027)
0.09***
(0.032)
0.00**
(0.000)
-1.65***
(0.231)
5,860
(0.772)
-0.43***
(0.068)
-0.03**
(0.017)
0.09***
(0.019)
0.01***
(0.000)
-2.33***
(0.358)
17,446
(0.580)
-0.54***
(0.063)
0.11***
(0.027)
0.09***
(0.032)
0.00**
Foreign
LnAge
LnManager
Size
(0.000)
-1.63***
Constant
(0.231)
Observations
5,860
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Subsequently, we consider the role of firm’s legality in moderating the relationship between
bribery and firm credit access. In this part, we created a dummy variable Formal that takes the
value of 1 if a firm is formally registered, and 0 otherwise. We then regress the equation (1) by
using the data for each type of firms. The result show that paying greasing bribery raises firm
credit access probability when measuring the existence of bribes both as a dummy variable and
a continuous variable. However, firms are limited in obtaining external finances if they are not
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formally registered. Regarding other control variables, they are only statistically significant in
the sub-sample of registered firms. These empirical results support our proposed hypothesis H3
that the effect of bribery on firm credit access is greater for formally-registered firms.
Table 7: Estimation results of sub-sample by legality
(1)
No
CA
(2)
Yes
CA
(3)
No
CA
(4)
Yes
CA
VARIABLES
DBri
0.07
0.23***
(0.031)
(0.405)
Bri
-0.02
(0.196)
-0.33
0.09***
(0.017)
0.32***
(0.022)
0.33***
(0.024)
0.10***
(0.007)
-0.42
RD
-0.35
(0.400)
0.14
0.32***
(0.022)
0.33***
(0.024)
0.10***
(0.007)
-0.44
(0.398)
0.12
Export
LnSalecap
State
(0.410)
-0.05
(0.410)
-0.05
(0.087)
-6.66
(0.086)
-6.70
(6.443)
0.47
(0.449)
-0.40***
(0.045)
0.04***
(0.014)
0.07***
(0.016)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.20***
(0.187)
(7.148)
0.46
(0.448)
-0.40***
(0.045)
0.04***
(0.014)
0.07***
(0.016)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.19***
(0.187)
Foreign
LnAge
LnManager
Size
(0.988)
0.13
(0.984)
0.14
(0.147)
0.03
(0.146)
0.04
(0.163)
0.00**
(0.001)
0.35
(0.163)
0.00**
(0.001)
0.35
Constant
(1.659)
(1.644)
Observations
Pseudo R2
168
23,089
0.195
168
23,089
0.194
0.312
0.312
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In the next step, we investigate the important role of market competition that may influence
the association between bribery and firm credit access. The effects of greasing bribery on firm’s
ability in attracting venture capital funding probability are stimulated if there is no competition
within the markets. The impacts of greasing bribes increase from 0.24% to 0.97% for firms that
do and do not face competitors in selling their main products, respectively. The similar evidence
can be found when considering the effects paying bribery payment amounts to bureaucrats. Fur-
thermore, Table 8 also highlights the differences between firm credit access probability and the
level of market competition. We define the market as the low competition if firms have less than
5 competitors and as the high competition if firms have more than 5 competitors1. The higher the
number of competitors in the market, the harder it is for firms to access external finance when
paying bribes. The role of bribery in promoting the firms’ ability in getting external finance be-
comes less sizable if they operate in the highly competitive markets. The results in Table 8 rein-
force the conclusion that the market competition negatively moderates the association between
bribery and firms’ credit access.
Table 8: Bribery and credit access with market competition
(2)
No
CA
(2)
Yes
CA
(3)
No
CA
(4)
Yes
CA
(5)
Low
CA
(6)
High
CA
(7)
Low
CA
(8)
High
CA
VARIABLES
DBri
0.97**
(0.390)
0.24***
(0.032)
0.32*** 0.22***
(0.068) (0.036)
Bri
0.48*** 0.09***
0.12***
(0.034)
0.09***
(0.020)
0.34***
(0.026)
0.33***
(0.028)
0.10***
(0.008)
(0.178)
0.32
(0.017)
RD
0.31
0.32***
(0.022)
0.32***
(0.025)
0.32*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.26***
(0.022) (0.043) (0.026) (0.043)
0.33*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.29***
(0.025) (0.054) (0.028) (0.054)
(0.266)
0.41
(0.266)
0.40
Export
LnSalecap
Foreign
(0.324)
0.29**
(0.117)
(0.326)
0.10*** 0.31*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.14***
(0.007) (0.118) (0.007) (0.022) (0.008) (0.022)
-1.95*** -0.39*** -1.98*** -0.39*** -0.48*** -0.37*** -0.48*** -0.38***
(0.571) (0.046) (0.575) (0.046) (0.091) (0.054) (0.091) (0.054)
1. Based on the questionnaire about the number of competitors, we select 5 competitors to define the low and
high level of competition.
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(0.167)
-0.03
(0.014)
0.07***
(0.017)
0.00***
(0.000)
-0.70
(0.167)
-0.04
(0.014)
0.07***
(0.017)
(0.029)
-0.01
(0.016)
0.10***
(0.019)
(0.029)
-0.01
(0.016)
0.10***
(0.019)
0.00***
(0.000)
-0.49
LnManager
Size
(0.173)
0.00
(0.174)
0.00
(0.035)
(0.035)
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
-0.68
(0.000)
-3.00
(0.000)
-0.51
(0.000)
-3.02
State
(0.474)
-2.21***
(0.189)
22,297
0.201
(0.473)
(2.053)
(0.478)
(2.045)
(0.477)
Constant
-2.72*
(1.646)
184
-2.90*
(1.653)
184
-2.20*** -2.08*** -2.27*** -2.06*** -2.26***
(0.189)
22,297
0.200
(0.372)
4,759
0.175
(0.192)
17,728
0.171
(0.371)
4,759
0.174
(0.192)
17,728
0.170
Observations
Pseudo R2
0.378
0.383
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: We define the market as the low competition if firms have less than 5 competitors
and as the high competition if firms have more than 5 competitors.
In the following analysis, we controlled both level of market competition and firms’ size
and described the results in Table 9. Under any circumstance, we detect that the marginal effects
of bribery on the probability of accessing credit are always more sizable for large-sized firms as
compared to those of SMEs, especially with low level of market competition. The effect of using
bribery is greater in larger firms (0.77 and 0.35 of the larger comparing to 0.29 and 0.15 of the
smaller) in both low and high level of market competition. Also, the effect of amount of bribe
payment on the firm’s credit accessibility are more considerable for the large-sized firms than
smaller-sized ones (0.42 and 0.12 comparing to 0.11 and 0.08). It can be observed that the level
of market competition may influence the moderating effects of firm’s bargaining power captured
by its size. To be more specific, the distinction in effects of bribery on credit access for SMEs
and large-sized firm is significant if these firms operate in the low competitive markets. However,
the competitions in the market seemingly reduce advantages of large-sized firms, which causes
them to benefit less from paying bribes. As a result, the credit accessibility of large-sized firms
diminishes if they face more pressures from their competitors in the market. Therefore, this en-
hances our two hypotheses that the effect of bribery on firm credit access is greater in larger
firms, especially in lower level of market competition.
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Table 9: Bribery and credit access with interaction between firms’ size
and firms facing market competition
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Low Market Competition High Market Competition Low Market Competition High Market Competition
SMEs
CA
Large
CA
SMEs
CA
Large
CA
SMEs
CA
Large
CA
SMEs
CA
Large
CA
VARIABLES
DBri
0.29***
(0.072)
0.77***
(0.267)
0.15***
(0.041)
0.35***
(0.072)
Bri
0.11***
(0.034)
0.23***
(0.049)
0.16**
(0.067)
0.12***
(0.025)
-3.69
0.42**
(0.177)
0.17*
0.08***
(0.023)
0.29***
(0.032)
0.18***
(0.038)
0.09***
(0.010)
-0.64
0.12***
(0.041)
0.37***
(0.044)
0.33***
(0.044)
0.08***
(0.014)
-0.77
RD
0.23***
(0.049)
0.16**
(0.067)
0.12***
(0.025)
-3.71
0.17*
(0.098)
0.23**
(0.098)
0.10*
0.29***
(0.032)
0.18***
(0.038)
0.09***
(0.010)
-0.62
0.36***
(0.044)
0.33***
(0.044)
0.08***
(0.014)
-0.84
(0.098)
0.23**
(0.098)
0.10*
Export
LnSalecap
State
(0.053)
-4.19*
(2.471)
-0.49***
(0.132)
-0.01
(0.052)
-4.23*
(2.468)
-0.50***
(0.131)
-0.01
(3.713)
-0.61***
(0.130)
-0.08**
(0.033)
-0.02
(0.767)
-0.37***
(0.080)
-0.02
(0.590)
-0.58***
(0.074)
0.13***
(0.030)
0.10***
(0.036)
0.00
(3.692)
-0.62***
(0.130)
-0.08**
(0.033)
-0.02
(0.767)
-0.37***
(0.080)
-0.02
(0.588)
-0.59***
(0.074)
0.13***
(0.030)
0.11***
(0.036)
0.00
Foreign
LnAge
LnManager
Size
(0.066)
0.10
(0.019)
0.13***
(0.022)
0.01***
(0.001)
-2.37***
(0.235)
13,724
0.161
(0.066)
0.09
(0.019)
0.13***
(0.022)
0.01***
(0.001)
-2.37***
(0.235)
13,724
0.161
(0.040)
0.01***
(0.001)
-2.08***
(0.431)
3,688
(0.077)
0.00***
(0.000)
-1.21
(0.040)
0.01***
(0.001)
-2.07***
(0.431)
3,688
(0.076)
0.00***
(0.000)
-1.17
(0.000)
-1.71***
(0.365)
4,734
(0.000)
-1.70***
(0.365)
4,734
Constant
(0.876)
1,112
(0.871)
1,112
Observations
Pseudo R2
0.162
0.230
0.174
0.161
0.228
0.172
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.2. Sector Variation
In this part, we examined the effect of bribery on firm credit access in different sectors.
We divided the data into three sectors as in Tomiura (2007): supplier-dominated, scale-intensive,
and science-based. There are 9,855 firms in supplier-dominated sector, 4,723 firms in scale-in-
tensive sector, and 7,184 firms in science-based sector. The effect of bribery on credit access in
science-based sector is the largest, while the ones in supplier-dominated and scale-intensive sector
remain quite similar to each other. Table 10 also shows that there is no significant difference in
effects of bribery on the probability of accessing credit across sectors.
Table 10: Estimation results of sub-sample by sector
Supplier-dominated
Scale-intensive
Science-based
VARIABLES
DBri
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
0.21***
(0.050)
0.21***
(0.072)
0.24***
(0.058)
Bri
RD
0.09***
(0.026)
0.32***
(0.035)
0.32***
(0.037)
0.10***
(0.011)
0.14
0.08*
(0.039)
0.29***
(0.052)
0.37***
(0.060)
0.08***
(0.017)
-1.66
0.09***
(0.032)
0.37***
(0.038)
0.24***
(0.044)
0.12***
(0.014)
-0.08
0.32***
(0.035)
0.32***
(0.037)
0.10***
(0.011)
0.13
0.29***
(0.052)
0.37***
(0.060)
0.08***
(0.017)
-1.64
0.37***
(0.038)
0.24***
(0.044)
0.12***
(0.014)
-0.13
Export
LnSalecap
State
(0.651)
-0.40***
(0.069)
0.02
(0.648)
-0.40***
(0.068)
0.02
(1.236)
-0.34***
(0.109)
0.00
(1.234)
-0.34***
(0.109)
0.00
(0.828)
-0.46***
(0.080)
0.07***
(0.026)
0.07**
(0.031)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.79***
(0.422)
6,652
(0.827)
-0.46***
(0.080)
0.08***
(0.026)
0.06**
(0.031)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.78***
(0.420)
6,652
Foreign
LnAge
LnManager
Size
(0.021)
0.05**
(0.025)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.06***
(0.268)
9,421
(0.021)
0.05**
(0.025)
0.00***
(0.000)
-2.06***
(0.268)
9,421
(0.034)
0.12***
(0.039)
0.00***
(0.000)
-1.23**
(0.547)
4,373
(0.034)
0.12***
(0.039)
0.00***
(0.000)
-1.21**
(0.547)
4,373
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2
0.197
0.197
0.186
0.185
0.200
0.199
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
25
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 2020
ICYREB 2020
5.3. IV Estimation
Until now, we have not dealt with the endogeneity issue that might cause our estimation
results to be biased. We, therefore, concentrate on this issue in this part. We follow Wellalage et
al. (2020) to use the sector-country average bribing amount (GBri_ivb and GBri_ivr) and firm’s
attitude toward the level of judiciary system corruption (Weak_Judiciary) as our instruments. We
then re-investigate the effects of bribery on the probability of credit access by employing instru-
mental variable probit models. We construct two sets of instruments: (GBri_ivb and Weak_Judi-
ciary) for DBri and (GBri_ivr and Weak_Judiciary) for Bri.
The results of the IV regression on full sample and sub-sample are displayed in Table 11.
Comparing to the benchmark estimation results in Table 5, our hypothesis about the effects of
bribery in credit access remains unchanged. All coefficients’ signs stay steadily with our earlier
estimations, but the marginal effects are substantially greater. These results firmly reinforce our
argument about the existence of “greasing the wheel of credit access” hypothesis.
Overall, the results coming from this IV model estimation strengthen our main conclusion
that bribery has positive effect on firm credit access. When contemplating endogeneity issue, the
influence of bribery on credit access is notably greater.
Table 11: IV model estimation
(1)
(2)
(5)
(6)
VARIABLES
CA
GDBri
CA
GBri
GDBri
0.45***
(0.119)
GBri
0.17***
(0.062)
0.32***
(0.023)
0.33***
(0.025)
0.11***
(0.007)
-0.58
RD
0.32***
(0.023)
0.33***
(0.025)
0.11***
(0.007)
-0.61
0.01***
(0.005)
0.02***
(0.005)
-0.01***
(0.002)
0.10
0.03***
(0.009)
0.03***
(0.010)
-0.02***
(0.003)
0.17
Export
LnSalecap
State
(0.472)
-0.36***
(0.045)
0.03**
(0.014)
0.08***
(0.017)
(0.096)
-0.02**
(0.009)
0.00
(0.472)
-0.37***
(0.045)
0.04**
(0.014)
0.08***
(0.017)
(0.180)
-0.02
Foreign
LnAge
LnManager
(0.017)
0.00
(0.003)
-0.01***
(0.003)
(0.005)
-0.02***
(0.006)
26
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